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fiXAIEUEfi2-0E-Ifi£QJES 
1. Did the trial court err in admitting defendant's 
son's statements that defendant made him steal merchandise as 
nonhearsay or under exceptions to the hearsay rule? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction of retail theft? 
3* Was the evidence sufficient to establish that 
defendant participated in retail theft of merchandise valued over 
$1000# a second-degree felony? 
iv 
76-6-602• Retail theft, acts constituting• 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention 
of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, 
price tag, marking, indicia of value or any 
other markings which aid in determining value 
of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale, in a retail mercantile 
establishment and attempts to purchase such 
merchandise personally or in consort with 
another at less than the retail value of such 
merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment from the container 
in or on which such merchandise is displayed 
to any other container with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of the retail value of 
such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of the retail value of 
the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment 
with the intent of depriving the merchant of 
the possession, use or benefit of such cart* 
•v-
IN "I HE UTAH COUR'T OF APPEALS 
S I I I 1 1 ; DF I I I ft H f I 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
; Case No 86 0 21 3 CA 
ANTHONi CiiMNi b ,li, mil1 i * , . : .. . . •. 
Detendant-Appellant 
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Defendan t
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t r i a l h e l d i"! il I , I ill! , in t h t T l n n i ( u d i c i a l I h s t r i c t I t 
i n a n d f o r Sdllll L a k e C u L i n t y . S t a t e o t U t a h , t h e H o n o r a b l e Hnmer 
f W 11 k i n s o ' i i ^ i -if ' f i i i« | i > > ' » i v l h 1 tin I ai 
May i f I l *^ i i i i in; Lii I i f t e e n y e a i s in i hit H l u h S t a t e P r i ' t 
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Oil MM1! emill * mi ! I "in ill l i i l i i , in I I | i f i i : j b b e r g f a s e c u r i t y 
employee at Lhe ZCMi Cottonwood Mall Stoief saw defendant and • ¥ 
boys on the second floor in tht credit drpartment n i I /7 / ni 
T h t i M H i n j t i I 1 , II II II II I i a t ibay i f 1 'aU Ii Mi l II II Ii i t w a s m i l n i b i In 
a is I Ii ( l< 128-29). M B , Skollingsberg followed them up the 
escalator and watched while defendant, who held a brown "Wolfe's" 
sack with some object in it, paced in front of the escalator and 
the boys left in separate directions (R. 129-30). After 2-3 
minutes, the boys returned with a large, plastic ZCMI bag (R. 
130-31). Defendant placed the doll and the Wolfe's parcel inside 
the ZCMI bag and handed it to the youngest boy (R. 132). The 
boys left again and returned after a few moments. Then all three 
exited the third floor on the escalator (R. 132). 
Ms. Skollingsberg called for more help and then 
followed the trio to the second floor where they wandered around 
for about five minutes (R. 133-34). The trio again rode the 
escalator to the third floor where the boys dispersed and then 
returned to defendant (R. 134-35) • Then the youngest boy 
disappeared and defendant and the older boy got on the escalator 
(R. 135). Ms. Skollingsberg heard defendant tell the oldest boy, 
as they rode to the second floor, that the other boy was lost and 
they might need help to find him (R. 135). 
Once they arrived on the second floor, defendant and 
the older boy exited to the parking terrace (R. 136) . There Ms. 
Skollingsberg saw the youngest boy talking to Stephen Hutchinson 
(R. 136). Mr. Hutchinson, whose wife works for ZCMI, had been 
asked to follow the boy by another store employee (R. 136, 164, 
191). 
At one point during the various trips up and down the 
escalator, Judith Hansen, the other store employee, heard 
defendant tell bis sons to take what they had and hide it or 
"ditch" it in the toy department (R. 163, 169). After hearing 
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David Bailey that he thought his son took something from the 
sound room (R. 171)• Defendant said he would get his son and 
return him to the department (R. 171) • Mr. Bailey thought this 
seemed suspicious, checked the displays and discovered that a 
Sony Bandi Camcorder was missing (R. 172). Mr. Bailey saw 
defendant in his department one to two hours earlier but had not 
spoken to defendant (R. 175). 
Neither defendant nor the boys had receipts for the 
doll or video equipment (R. 142). The doll sold for $36 (R. 
137). The video camera and recorder sold as a package for $1849 
on sale and $1979 regular price (R. 173-74). The video equipment 
was not priced or sold separately (R. 180-81). 
I. The trial court properly admitted as non-hearsay 
statements by defendant's child that defendant made him steal 
merchandise. When the boy made these statements, he had been 
recruited by defendant to transfer and/or conceal ZCMI 
merchandise and was acting as defendant's agent. 
Furthermore, the statements were also admissible as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were excited 
utterances, statements of present-sense impressions or statements 
of the child's state of mind expressing his motive to shoplift. 
II and III. The evidence sufficiently linked defendant 
to the stolen merchandise to establish that defendant committed 
retail theft and that the merchandise was worth more than $1000. 
This evidence revealed defendant's use of his children to conceal 
transfer and carry away ZCMI merchandise without paying the 
retail price. 
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ABGUMEfll 
£fiUULX 
DEFENDANTS SON'S INCULPATORY STATEMENT 
HAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The trial court admitted statements made by defendant's 
son at the time of his apprehension over defendant's hearsay 
objection. The court's ruling was based upon Utah R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(D) (Supp. 1986) that the boy's statements: "I didn't 
want to do this. My Dad made me do this." were those of an agent 
of defendant. The court found , therefore, that the statements 
were not hearsay. 
On appeal, defendant argues that his child was not his 
agent but that even if he was, the statements were not within the 
scope of his agency nor made during the existence of the 
relationship and, consequently, they were inadmissible hearsay. 
Defendant also appears to claim that his son was not a co-
conspirator or that, even if he was, the statements were not 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they were not made 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The 
trial court, however, correctly admitted the statements under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and as developed below, defendant inaccurately 
confuses the •agent" rule with the •conspirator" rule. 
Utah adopted the Federal Rule 801 verbatim. For this 
reason, the Utah courts look to interpretation of federal rules 
as guidance for interpretation of the Utah rule. ]Stfl£e_Y* GEBY* 
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). Federal courts do not blur rules 
801(d)(2)(D) and 801(d)(2)(E) into a single non-hearsay rule. 
See 4 Neinstein t Berger, HfiinfitfiinlS-fixidfiDCS 801-233 to 801-23 5 
5 
(13th ed. 1985) • While both the Utah Supreme Court, see £££££_£.•. 
GL&XI 717 P.2d at 1316, and federal courts have said that the 
conspirator rule is based upon agency theory, that reference is 
to traditional agency theory that required the statements to have 
been within the scope of the agent's authority* Defendant 
mistakenly expands this expression of a limitation on the 
conspirator rule to create a similar limitation on the agent rule 
as it currently exists. Rule 801(d)(2)(D), however, is not 
limited to statements that were authorized by the principal as 
defendant suggests. £££ 4 Hfiinsifiiulfi at 801-219. All that is 
required for admission of statements of an agent made during the 
agency relationship is that they jLfilaifi to a matter within the 
scope of the agency. 4 HfiinfitfiiDlfi at 801-222. This Court 
should not, therefore, apply cases relating to the conspirator 
rule to determine the contours of the agency rule as defendant 
urges it do do. 
As previously stated, the trial court properly grounded 
admission of the child's statements on the agent rule, 
801(d)(2)(D). That rule provides: 
(d) . . . A statement is not hearsay if 
. . . 
(2) . . . The statement is offered against a 
party and is . . . (D) a statement by his 
agent or servant concerning a matter within 
the scope of his agency or employment, made 
during the existence of the relationship. • . 
Prom the evidence recited above, it was clear that this child was 
recruited by his father to commit retail theft and that when the 
child made the statements in issue, they related to his acts of 
thett and that the agency relationship still existed. 
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Federal courts have admitted statements of agents in 
similar situations. For example, in flnitfijLStfltfifi-X-i-SuoiDfilfi, 
598 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1979), a city councilman recruited a 
utility contractor to solicit kick-backs for him. The 
contractor's statements were admitted against the councilman 
under 801(d)(2)(D) because the government took the position that 
the contractor was not a co-conspirator and that 801(d)(2)(E) did 
not apply. 
Proof of the agency relationship must, of course, be 
proved by evidence other than the alleged agent's statements. 
Uni£fid_Sl;fl±£S_YA-3flI}£S# 766 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1985). This 
evidence must be substantial, however, proof of an agency 
relationship need not be by a preponderance, Id. ciiina I2oi££d 
SiatfiS-X^ ElflLfifi# 679 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1982), ££tt. 
dfiDifidf 459 U.S. 1148 (1983). 
The evidence of an agency relationship between 
defendant and his son is substantial in this case. As recited 
more fully above, defendant directed his sons in a scheme to 
remove merchandise from the ZCMI store by bringing it to him and 
placing it inside a ZCMI store sack. Although there is no 
testimony of statements made by defendant to his sons directing 
them to steal merchandise, defendant's actions establish that 
this was what was happening. Based upon this substantial 
evidence, the trial court was correct in admitting the statements 
as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Furthermore, this Court 
should not disturb the trial court's decision to admit alleged 
hearsay absent an abuse of discretion. UDii£d-jLtfli£S_X*_iflDfi£# 
766 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1985). No such abuse occurred here. 
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Moreover, the state did not and does not now advance 
the theory that the evidence was admissible as non-hearsay as an 
admission of a co-conspirator. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) requires that 
the statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy* It 
cannot be seriously asserted that this child's exclamation 
inculpating his father in his criminal activity was made in 
furtherance of the criminal joint venture. jSfifi S£ai£-.JU_filAX# 
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). Rather, the state chooses to rely on 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a statement by an agent, as the basis for 
admission of the child's statements* 
Even if this Court finds that the statements were 
hearsay, they were still admissible under at least tnree 
exceptions to the hearsay rule* Admittedly, the trial court did 
not apply these three hearsay exceptions nor did the state 
advance two of these theories at trial. This Court may 
nevertheless atfirm the trial court's decision to admit the 
evidence on any proper ground, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling. fiiaifi-XA-Srsy# 717 P.2d 
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). The lower court's ruling on the 
admissibility of the evidence should not be disturbed where it 
was not clearly in error. Id. In this case, there are three 
other theories upon which the evidence was properly admitted and, 
consequently, the trial court did not err in its admission. 
First, the child's statements were admissible as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were excited 
utterances under Rule 803(2). Here, the child exclaimed to an 
adult who pursued him outside the store while he carried stolen 
8-
merchandise that his father made him steal the merchandise* At 
the time the statements were made, the child was under the stress 
of excitement from being discovered and pursued as a shoplifter 
and the statements were directly related to his criminal 
activities. They were spontaneous and could not have been "the 
result of fabrication; intervening actions, or the exercise of 
choice or judgment." S.t£i£_:su_Kay.fc££, 6 84 P.2d 63, 6 4 (Utah 
1984) quoting, &QhnSt>Qn-X+-Qbla i 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 
(1969). JSfiS AlSfl ££fli£_X*-bcMiilAD# 588 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 
1978). 
Second, the child's statements also qualified as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were statements 
explaining an event made during the event or immediately 
thereafter under Rule 803(1). The rule provides the following 
exception: 
A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
The crucial question here is whether the declaration was part of 
a continuous mental process influenced by the event described or 
explained. See 4 Weinstein & Berger, JSfiinSifiiD«fi_fiYidfiD£fi 
§803(1)[Dl] (1985). This is frequently referred to as the 
continuity of event analysis. Application of this rule assumes 
that the statements were highly reliable because they were 
simultaneous with the child's capture; resulting in no memory 
problem and "little or no time for calculated misstatement" by 
the child. 4 KfiiDfitfiiDlfi-BxidfiDCfi at 803-74. £££ Aififi Halted 
£*Aififi_YA_E£fl£flCk# 654 P.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on 
other grounds 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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Finally, the statements also qualified for admission 
under 803(3) as 
[a] statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, 
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health). . . 
This exception is really a specialized application of Rule 
803(1), Fed. R. Evid. 803, advisory committee notes. Much of the 
justification for one applies to the other. Again the crucial 
question is the continuity of event analysis. 
Here, the child's statements related to his motive to 
commit the criminal acts for which he had just been apprehended. 
He was explaining why he was found crouching behind a car holding 
stolen merchandise. As such, the explanation should be admitted 
as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
£QJLBT_iI 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT. 
Defendant urges this Court to overturn his conviction 
of retail theft on the theory that the evidence adduced at trial 
was insufficient to establish all of the elements of the crime. 
A review of the record reveals, however, that based upon the 
standard of review articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, there 
was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim is strict: 
When there is any evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
it, from which findings of all the requisite 
10-
elements of the crime can be reasonably made, 
(the] inquiry stops and [the Court] 
sustainls] the verdict. 
S*ai£_XA-.M2ClfliD# 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). There was 
evidence presented at trial supporting each element of the 
offense which this Court must assume the jury believed, £Jta££_JU 
fi£H£ll# 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982); SiflJt£-X*_BflDC3dar case no. 
860243-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App., decided May 13, 1987). That 
evidence revealed that defendant directed his children on 
November 23, 19 86 in a scheme to obtain a video camera/recorder 
and a "Cabbage Patch" doll from the ZCMI store in the Cottonwood 
Mall without paying for them. 
The children were observed meeting with defendant and 
exchanging packages with him several times on different floors of 
the store. Defendant placed a "Cabbage Patch" doll into a white 
ZCMI bag and returned it to one of the boys who was later 
apprehended outside the store with the doll (R. 131-32, 202). 
The boy told his captor "I didn't want to do this. My dad made 
me do this." (R. 201). 
ZCMI employees also saw defendant holding a brown, 
plastic "Wolfe's" bag containing some object and watched as 
defendant placed this bag inside the ZCMI bag along with the doll 
(R. 132). The Wolfe's bag, which contained a video camera 
belonging to ZCMI, was later discovered on the front seat of 
defendant's car (R. 140*41, 185). 
At one point, defendant told the boys to ditch or hide 
what they had in the toy department (R. 163, 169). One boy later 
led a store employee to the toy department where he pointed out 
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the recorder portion of the missing video equipment hidden under 
a display, completely concealed from view (R. 138-40)* Neither 
defendant nor the boys possessed receipts for any of these items 
(R. 142). 
Defendant argued at trial and claims again on appeal 
that his children, or one of them, was the shoplifter and that 
defendant was unaware of this activity. Nevertheless, the 
evidence and the inferences that can fairly be drawn from it 
suggest otherwise. The jury could have believed that defendant 
said he thought his child had stolen something and continued to 
disbelieve that defendant intended to prevent his child's success 
at removing the video equipment from the store* At the time 
defendant made this statement, store employes had followed him up 
and down the escalator and from department to department. The 
jury could have concluded that defendant discovered he was being 
followed and attempted to cast blame on his child rather than 
vice versa. The jury was not required to accept defendant's 
contradictory interpretation of the evidence, Mflncad£# slip op. 
at 1. 
Moreover, the jury could reasonably have concluded that 
8 year old children who are shoplifting without their parent's 
knowledge do not simply place the stolen merchandise in plain 
view on the front seat of their parent's car. Interestingly, it 
was defendant who provided the police officer with the keys to 
his car, which was locked (R. 185, 198-88). There was no 
evidence that the children had accessed the keys with or without 
defendant's knowledge. 
-i ?-
Finally, the 8 year old boy's exclamation implicating 
defendant adds credence to the evidence that defendant committed 
the crime charged. Even if defendant were not the person who 
physically removed the items from the store, Utah law provides 
for conviction of a person "who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person • • • " engaging 
in criminal conduct. Utah Code Ann. 576-2-202 (1978) .* 
Furthermore, § 76-6-60 2(1) provides that a person who ££U£££ 
merchandise to be carried away or transferred with the intent to 
retain it or with intent to permanently deprive the merchant of 
its user benefit or possession without paying for it is guilty of 
retail theft. Defendant unquestionably caused all of the items 
in question to be either carried away or transferred by the 
children. Defendant's intent to retain the items or permanently 
deprive ZCMI of them must be inferred from all of the 
circumstances described above and was reasonably found by the 
jury. This Court should, therefore, affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED RETAIL THEFT OF 
MERCHANDISE WORTH MORE THAN $1000. 
Classification of the offense of retail theft is 
controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978). JSfifi Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-606 (Cum. Supp. 1986). Defendant was convicted of a 
1
 The jury was not instructed on this statute, however, the lack 
of such an instruction does not appear fatal where Utah law 
clearly creates culpability for such activity and where the 
retail theft statute, S 76-6-602(1), incorporates a similar 
policy. 
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second-degree felony under S 76-6-412(a)(i) because the value of 
the property exceeded $1000. Defendant insists that he should 
not have been convicted of a felony at all because the only 
property connected to him was the dollf valued at $36, and theft 
of the doll alone was a class B misdemeanor under S 76-6-412(d). 
Much of defendants argument centers on whether there 
was sufficient evidence linking defendant to the video camera and 
the recorder* This argument is really an extension of the 
argument in his Point II as defendant does not challenge the 
evidence of the value of each item in question. Defendant merely 
reasserts his defense that, if anything was taken, his son was 
responsible rather than himself. As established in Point II, 
above, there is more than sufficient evidence linking defendant 
to all of these items. Defendant placed a "Wolfe's" bag that 
contained an object inside a larger ZCMI bag along with the doll 
and gave it to his son. Later, Officer Kartchner found the 
Wolfe's bag, containing the video camera, on the front seat of 
defendant's car where defendant's son told Ms. Skollingsberg it 
was located. Defendant's son was apprehended outside the store 
with the doll. Defendant told his son to hide or ditch something 
in the toy department. The boy led Ms. Skollingsberg to the 
video recorder which was hidden under a display in the toy 
department. These facts sufficiently established a link between 
defendant and the merchandise to sustain his conviction. The 
only remaining issue is whether these facts also established 
defendant's intent to permanently deprive ZCMI of the video 
recorder without paying for it. 
-1i-
Defendant argues that intent to permanently deprive was 
not established because the video recorder never left the store 
and because defendant told a store employee that he thought his 
son might have taken something. Defendant cites an Illinois 
case, EfiQPlg«x.aJEfllflfll£S* 328 N.E.2d 210 (111. App. 1975), for 
the proposition that the theft of the video recorder was 
incomplete, apparently until removed from the store. The 
£dl9£I£S court affirmed a conviction for attempted theft where 
merchandise was concealed in a bag, not paid for, but not removed 
from the store because the suspect was apprehended inside the 
store. While the Illinois theft statute in effect in 1975 was 
not included in the text of the opinion, it is apparent that 
asportation was required to complete the offense at that time. 
In contrast, the Utah retail theft statute does not require 
asportation. Section 76-6-602(1) states: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention 
of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possesion, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise; • . . 
While a person who removed (carried away) items from the premises 
would clearly have committed retail theft, a person who conceals 
or transfers merchandise within the store with the intent to 
retain it or the intent to permanently deprive (or caused its 
concealment or transfer) has also committed retail theft. Here, 
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defendant caused the transfer and concealment of the video 
recorder. His intent can only be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding the events. The jury must have inferred that 
defendant either intended to retain the recorder when it was 
transferred from its original location, or to permanently deprive 
ZCMI of the recorder when he told his son to transfer and conceal 
it or when he participated in the removal of the camera, without 
which the recorder was useless to ZCMI since these items sold as 
a unit. 
Defendant's argument to the contrary rests on his 
assertion that the jury must have believed that defendant's 
statement to Mr. Bailey about his son having taken something 
absolved defendant of any guilt. Regardless of defendant's 
claim, this Court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. SJtai£-XA-MQDCfldflr slip op. at 
1. The interpretation of this evidence that is most favorable to 
the verdict is that defendant was trying to deflect suspicion 
from himself to his son after defendant discovered that ZCMI 
security employees were following him throughout the store. 
Neither the jury nor this Court must accept defendant's version 
of the facts. Id. 
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Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State requests 
this Court to atfirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED t h i s @jh day of June, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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